M  "fllEXLlBKlS 


THE  COORDINATION  OF  THE  MOBILE  AND  COAST 

ARTILLERY  UNITS  OF  THE  ARMY  IN  THE 

NATIONAL  DEFENSE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8911-9 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER.   1915 


508 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


/V    /  •  /^-^  /  '/J 


if 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  508. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.    IXTRODUCTIOX. 


1.  Relation  between  statecraft  and  war 5 

2.  Defense  against  over-sea  invasion 5 

3.  Function  of  the  Navy 5 

4.  Function  of  the  Army 6 

II.  Functions  of  the  Mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  Troops. 

5.  Two  classes  of  troops  required ^ 

G.  Mobile  troops ^ 

7.  Coast  Artillery 6 

III.  Mutual  Dependence  op  Mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  Troops. 

8.  Cooperation  of  mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  units 7 

9.  Landings  at  unfortified  points 8 

10.  Role  of  movable  Coast  Artillery 8 

11.  Development  of  heavy  movable  armament  in  the  European  war 9 

12.  Adequate  mobile  troops  necessarj' 10 

13.  Land  defense  of  seacoast  fortifications 10 

30669°— No.  508 10  (3)  * 


667363 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/coordinationofmoOOunitrich 


THE  COORDINATION  OF  THE  MOBILE  AND  COAST  AR- 
TILLERY UNITS  OF  THE  ARMY  IN  THE  NATIONAL 
DEFENSE. 

I.    INTRODUCTION. 

1.  RELATION  BETWEEN  STATECRAFT  AND  WAR. 

In  our  country  public  opinion  estimates  the  situation,  statecraft 
shapes  the  policy,  while  the  duty  of  executing  it  devolves  upon  the 
military  and  naval  departments.  In  settling  disputes  under  our 
foreign  policies,  the  weapons  of  our  statesmen  are,  first,  diplomacy 
and,  second,  war;  when  diplomacy  fails  to  settle  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute, it  may  be  necessary  to  resort  to  war.  Should  such  a  contin- 
gency arise,  we  must  be  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy  on  sea  and  land. 
This  preparation  should  be  adequate  at  all  times  or  else  our  national 
policies  will  be  aborted  or  frustrated.  Such  preparation  includes 
as  its  most  vital  element  the  development  of  our  land  and  sea  forces. 

2.  DEFENSE  AGAINST  OVER-SEA  INVASION. 

The  object  of  this  study  is  to  treat  primarily  of  operations  which 
will  come  in  one  way  or  another  from  the  sea  and  to  which  we  are 
most  vulnerable.  Consideration  is  therefore  limited  to  operations 
possible  along  our  seacoast,  and  an  attempt  is  made  to  show  clearly 
the  correlative  functions  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  and  the  result- 
ant necessity  of  the  cooperation  of  the  mobile  and  coast  artillery 
units  of  our  land  forces  so  as  to  best  utilize  our  means  of  defense, 
in  conjunction  with  our  Navy. 

•3.  FUNCTION  OF  THE  NAVY. 

Upon  the  Navy  devolves  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  securing 
and  maintaining  control  of  the  sea.  To  accomplish  this  it  must  be 
free  to  take  the  offensive  promptly,  that  is,  to  seek  out  and  defeat 
the  enemy  fleet.  The  use  of  any  part  of  the  high-sea  fleet  for  local 
defense  defeats  the  chief  object  of  the  Navy,  and  is  a  misuse  of  naval 
power.  A  fleet  defeated  at  sea  and  undefended  by  an  adequate  army 
is  powerless  either  to  prevent  invasion  or  even  its  own  ultimate 
destruction  bv  combined  hostile  land  and  naval  forces. 


508 


(5) 


4.  FUNCTION  OF  THE  ARMY. 

Upon  the  Army  devolves  the  task  of  gaining  and  maintaining  on 
shore  the  ascendency  over  hostile  land  and  naval  operations.  To 
accomplish  this  it  must  be  able  to  seek  out  promptly  and  to  defeat, 
capture,  or  destroy  the  invader  wherever  he  may  attempt  either  to 
secure  a  footing  upon  our  territory  or  to  enter  the  waters  of  our 
harbors  with  the  object  of  threatening  the  destruction  of  the  seaport 
or  of  a  fleet  driven  to  seek  refuge  or  repair  therein. 

II.   FUNCTION   OF  THE  MOBILE  AND  COAST  ARTILLERY 

TROOPS. 

5.  TWO  CLASSES  OF  TROOPS  REQUIRED. 

Experience  has  shown  that  our  Army  must  consist  of  two  distinct 
classes  of  troops — that  is,  mobile  troops  and  coast  artillery  troops. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  principal  function  of  our  mobile  troops  is  to 
oppose  an  invading  army.,  while  that  of  our  coast  artillery  is  to 
oppose  direct  naval  attacl's. 

6.  MOBILE  TROOPS. 

The  best  defense  can  be  accomplished  only  by  the  ability  to  resort 
to  offensive  operations.  Our  mobile  troops  are  organized  on  the 
basis  of  being  able  to  resort  to  offensive  as  well  as  defensive  opera- 
tions.   Some  of  the  functions  of  the  mobile  troops  are : 

(a)  To  furnish  detachments  of  mobile  forces  sufficient  for  the 
protection  of  harbor  defenses  and  naval  bases  against  landing  par- 
ties during  naval  raids  which,  under  modern  conditions,  may  pre- 
cede a  declaration  of  war. 

(5)  To  oppose  an  invading  army  and  to*  operate  in  any  possible 
theater  of  war. 

{c)  To  furnish  adequate  mobile  forces  to  protect  our  principal 
cities  by  preventing  the  landing  of  hostile  expeditions  for  their  cap- 
ture in  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harbors  or  near  such  cities. 

The  only  reasonable  way  in  Avhich  these  localities  not  covered  by 
fixed  defenses  can  be  defended  is : 

(1)  By  providing  a  mobile  land  force  of  sufficient  strength,  so 
located  that  it  may  be  throAvn  in  at  threatened  points  at  the  proper 
time. 

(2)  By  supplying  in  addition  modern  movable  coast  defense  ar- 
mament of  heavy  types  to  resist  the  direct  naval  attack  of  the  cover- 
ing fleet. 

7.  COAST  ARTILLERY. 

Our  coast  artillery  is  primarily  organized  for  defensive  operations. 
Some  of  its  functions  are : 

{a)  To  prevent  naval  occupation  of  important  strategic  and  com- 
mercial harbors. 

508 


(&)  To  prevent  naval  bombardment  of  such  cities  and  military 
and  naval  bases  as  are  protected  b}'^  seacoast  fortifications. 

{c)  To  furnish  a  strong,  fortified  base  from  which  submarines 
and  other  naval  vessels,  acting  on  the  offensive,  may  operate. 

{(l)  To  repel  a  Meet  supporting  a  landing  in  force  within  range 
of  the  guns  of  a  fortified  harbor. 

(e)  To  cooperate  with  th,e  mobile  troops  in  the  landward  defense 
of  seacoast  fortifications. 

With  the  development  of  modern  movable  artillery  of  large  cali- 
ber and  long  range,  the  functions  of  the  coast  artillery  will  be  ex- 
tended to  repelling  direct  naval  attack  at  certain  unfortified  harbors 
and  favorable  landing  beaches  in  the  intervals  between  the  present 
fortified  harbors,  under  the  commanders  of  the  mobile  forces. 

III.    MUTUAL  DEPENDENCE   OF   MOBILE  AND   COAST 
ARTILLERY  TROOPS. 

8.  COOPERATION  OF  MOBILE  AND  COAST  ARTILLERY   UNITS. 

While  our  Xavy  retains  command  of  the  sea,  the  only  invasion 
possible  would  come  from  raiding  parties,  limited  in  numbers,  which 
an  enemy  fleet  might  land.  In  addition,  therefore,  to  the  coast 
artillery  troops  required  to  man  the  emplaced  batteries  and  the  mine 
defense  of  our  fortified  harbors,  sufficient  mobile  troops  should  be 
provided  to  repel  local  raiding  parties  that  might  land  to  attack  the 
fortifications.  The  personnel  of  the  Army  assigned  to  the  fixed-gun 
defense,  the  mine  defense,  and  the  land  defense  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  fortifications,  may  be  classed  while  on  this  duty  as 
immobile  to  the  extent  that  their  duties  are  local  and  pertain  par- 
ticularly to  the  harbors-  to  which  they  are  assigned.  Thus  it  is 
manifest  that  a  portion  of  our  mobile  troops  must  be  used  at  times 
as  fortress  troops,  while  the  development  of  modern  high-power 
movable  coast-defense  armament  of  heavy  types  will  render  a  portion 
of  our  coast  artillery  troops  more  or  less  mobile. 

Should  our  Navy  lose  command  of  the  sea,  the  fleet  wall  seek  ref- 
uge in  our  fortified  harbors,  under  the  protection  of  their  guns. 
Here  they  may  repair  and  refit,  and  they  may  be  able  to  render 
valuable  assistance  in  opposing  the  landing  of  an  invading  army. 
Assuming  that  our  preparations  are  sufficient  to  prevent  the  enemy 
fleet  from  capturing  the  armament  of  our  fortified  harbors,  running 
by  the  forts,  or  from  resorting  to  distant  bombardment  of  the  cities 
thereon,  he  will  be  forced  to  attempt  any  landing  (his  only  other 
means  of  inflicting  damage)  in  the  intervals  between  the  fortified 
harbors.  This  effort  can  be  frustrated  only  by  adequate  mobile 
forces  held  at  strategic  centers  near  the  coast  and  rushed  to  the 
threatened  points  at  the  proper  time.    This  force  should  be  sufficient 

508 


8 

in  numbers,  training,  armament,  and  equipment  to  accomplish  its 
purpose. 

In  defenaing  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harbors,  the  mov- 
able coast  artillery  becomes  one  of  the  auxiliary  elements  of  the 
mobile  force ;  mutual  dependence  of  the  two  kinds  of  troops  along  our 
coast  line  and  frontier  makes  their  cooperation  imperative ;  movable 
heavy  coast  artillery  armament  renders  such  cooperation  more 
effective. 

9.  LANDINGS  AT  UNFORTIFIED  POINTS. 

History  shews  that  landings  at  unfortified  points  have  always  been 
effected  when  backed  up  by  the  fire  of  a  fleet.  This  is  well  illustrated 
in  the  recent  landings  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  where  the  allied 
fleet,  after  being  defeated  in  the  attempt  to  run  by  or  reduce  the  Dar- 
danelles batteries,  supported  the  allied  army  on  Gallipoli  and  en- 
abled it  to  land,  despite  the  vigorous  defense  of  the  Turkish  mobile 
forces. 

10.  ROLE  OF  MOVABLE  COAST  ARTILLERY. 

With  the  development  and  employment  of  large  caliber  movable 
coast  artillery,  it  is  confidently  believed  that  at  points  near  our  coastal 
railroads  the  covering  fleet  may  be  held  off  at  such  a  distance  as  to 
prevent  the  use  of  the  secondary  batteries  in  supporting  the  landing, 
which  is  therefore  liable  to  be  defeated  by  the  fire  of  field  artillery 
and  small  arms  before  reaching  the  shore.  Thus  it  is  manifest  that 
the  development  of  heavy  movable  artillery  will  greajtly  strengthen 
our  coast  defense.  This  type  of  ordnance  may  be  concentrated  at 
points  under  attack,  and  when  no  longer  required  there  can  be  rapidly 
shifted  to  other  threatened  points  on  the  coast,  where-  its  effect  would 
be  the  greater  in  that  it  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise  to  the 
enemy,  thus  enabling  the  coast  artillery  and  heavy  field  artillery  to 
cooperate  with  the  other  mobile  troops  in  the  protection  of  the  inter- 
vals between  the  fortified  harbors.  The  development  of  a  heavy  type 
of  movable  artillery  forms  another  link  between  the  coast  and  field 
artillery  and  between  our  present  coast  artillery  and  mobile  troops. 
Unfortified  anchorages  and  favorable  landing  beaches  near  our 
coastal  railroads  may  be  protected  against  direct  naval  attack;  the 
enemy  fleet  may  be  driven  out  of  range  of  the  coast  artillery,  and  the 
invading  army  deprived  of  the  support  of  the  fleet  during  the  land- 
ing. The  transports  will,  of  course,  be  compelled  to  lower  their  boats 
out  of  range  of  these  batteries,  and  an  excellent  opportunity  will 
be  given  to  our  mobile  troops  to  defeat  the  invaders  before  they  can 
set  foot  on  the  shore. 


508 


11.  DEVELOPMENT    OF    HEAVY    MOVABLE    ARMAMENT    IN 
EUROPEAN  WAR. 

All  information  from  the  European  armies  shows  that  the  develop- 
ment and  employment  of  heavy  movable  artillery  is  one  of  the  most 
l^rominent  features  of  the  present  European  war.  It  has  been  suc- 
cessfully employed  there  in  demolishing  fortifications  and  in  blasting 
the  enemy  out  of  his  trenches,  '\ATiile  the  general  character  of  roads 
and  bridges  in  the  United  States  will  undoubtedly  operate  to  restrict 
the  use  of  the  large-caliber  guns  and  howitzers  in  field  warfare,  there 
is  no  question  of  the  feasibility  of  their  employment  as  movable  coast 
artillery  along  our  coastal  railroads.  Descriptions  given  in  the  news- 
papers and  illustrated  periodicals  and  the  moving  pictures  of  war 
scenes  and  implements  shown  at  our  theaters  illustrate  how  this 
heavj'  movable  ordnance  may  be  thus  employed. 

Successful  tests  have  been  made  with  the  1-2-inch  Xavy  gun 
mounted  on  specially  constructed  railroad  car.  This  gun  as  mounted 
has  a  range  of  about  13  miles,  and  fires  a  projectile  weighing  about 
800  pounds  with  over  200  pounds  bursting  charge :  it  is  transported 
on  and  fired  from  its  specially  designed  railroad  car.  On  account 
of  their  mobility  these  gims  can  be  moved  rapidly  to  the  menaced 
points  of  the  coast,  be  immediateh'  prepared  for  action,  and  when 
threatened  by  the  enemy's  superior  artillery  can  retreat  or  change 
position  in  a  minimum  time.  In  fact,  this  uniting  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  pieces  of  artillery  constitutes  a  mobile  fort,  powerful  and 
economical.  In  addition  to  these  heavy  gun  batteries,  heavy  how- 
itzers have  been  similarly  mounted  on  specially  constructed  railroad 
trucks,  from  which  they  are  fired  without  having  to  construct  plat- 
forms to  receive  them ;  the  trucks  are  braced  before  firing  to  support 
the  shock  of  discharge. 

In  line  with  the  above,  our  Ordnance  Department  has  prepared 
estimates  for  a  11-incli  gun  to  be  transported  on  and  fired  from  a 
specially  designed  railroad  truck.  This  gun  is  to  have  a  range  of 
30,000  yards  (IT  miles)  and  to  fire  a  shell  Aveighing  1,G(J0  pounds. 

The  30.5  centimeter  (12-inch)  Austrian  Skoda  mortar  is  practi- 
cally our  12-inch  seacoast  mortar,  while  the  -12  centimeter  (16.o-incli) 
mortar  (Krupp)  is  larger  than  any  now  emplaced  in  our  fortifica- 
tions; it  fires  a  shell  weighing  about  1,800  pounds.  Both  of  these 
types  of  mortars  are  readily  transported  by  railroad,  or  over  ex- 
ceptionally good  roads  and  bridges  by  motor  tractors.  From  photo- 
graphs and  descriptions  of  these  mortars  and  carriages  it  is  appar- 
ent that  heavy  ordnance  of  this  type  can  be  effiectually  employed 
as  an  adjunct  to  our  seacoast  fortl'fica.twns. 

These  developments  abroad  suggest  the  tremendous  gain  the  em- 
ployment of  heavy  movable  artillery  will  give  us  in  the  defense  of 

508 


10 

our  coast.  In  addition  to  the  fixed  defense  of  our  fortified  harbors, 
the  employment  of  heavy  movable  artillery  will  make  it  possible  to 
defend  not  only  our  important  strategic  fortified  harbors  and  naval 
bases,  but  also  to  repel  a  hostile  fleet  supporting  a  landing  in  force 
at  points  on  our  coastal  railroads.  It  is  understood  that  the  War 
Department's  estimates  to  Congress  will  include  14-inch  seacoast 
guns  mounted  on  specially  designed  railroad  trucks,  and  16-inch 
mortars  mounted  on  movable  carriages.  If  these  are  provided  the 
area  of  operations  of  our  coast  artillery  will  be  materially  extended. 
Certain  unfortified  anchorages  and  beaches  favorable  for  landing, 
as  well  as  the  present  fortified  harbors,  may  be  successfully  defended 
against  direct  naval  attack. 

12.  ADEQUATE  MOBILE  TROOPS  NECESSARY. 

It  should  be  understood,  however,  that  the  employment  of  movable 
coast  artillery  is  principally  against  a  direct  naval  attack,  as  is  the 
employment  of  fixed  guns  in  our  fortified  harbors  and  naval  bases. 
In  landing  troops  for  an  attack  against  a  fortified  harbor  an  enemy 
would  naturally  select  a  landing  place  out  of  range  of  its  guns. 

Mobile  troops  would  be  necessary  to  defend  and  support  the  heavy 
guns,  whether  fixed,  as  in  our  fortifications,  or  movable,  as  along 
our  railroads. 

The  employment  of  heavy  artillery  alone  could  not  prevent  an  en- 
terprising enemy  from  landing  troops.  Heavy  movable  ordnance 
may  indeed  render  valuable  assistance  to  our  mobile  troops  in  re- 
pelling a  landing  in  force  in  the  intervals  between  our  fortified 
harbors,  but  trained  mobile  troops  can  be  successfully  opposed  only 
by  the  employment  of  trained  mobile  troops  against  them.  It  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  our  coast  line  consists  almost  entirely  of  "  in- 
tervals." The  fortified  harbors  are  few  in  number  and  far  apart. 
Even  with  the  addition  to  our  armament  of  heavy  movable  artillery 
along  our  coastal  railways,  there  would  still  remain  numerous  long 
stretches  of  our  coast  line  and  anchorages  affording  facilities  for 
landing  operations  which  could  only  be  opposed  by  mobile  troops 
acting  without  the  cooperation  of  the  Coast  Artillery.  The  United 
States  should  therefore  have  sufficient  trained,  organized,  and 
equipped  mobile  troops  to  defeat  at  the  coast  line  or  frontier  the 
army  that  any  over-sea  power  could  bring  against  us. 

13.  LAND  DEFENSE  OF  SEACOAST  FORTIFICATIONS. 

The  defense  of  the  fortified  harbors  on  the  land  side  must  be  in 
the  hands  of  the  mobile  troops.  From  the  time  of  actual  investment 
by  the  enemy's  army  it  is  essential  that  all  of  the  fixed  armament 
in  the  seacoast  fortifications  capable  of  being  used  in  the  land  de- 

508 


11 

fense  be  so  mounted  that  it  may  be  fired  landward  as  an  adjunct 
of  the  Field  Artillery  as  well  as  seaward  against  the  hostile  navy. 

Generally  speaking,  the  seacoast  mortars  (which  have  all-around 
fire)  are  the  only  parts  of  the  heavy  fixed  armament  now  so  em- 
placed  that  they  can  be  used  in  the  land  defense,  but  at  all  forts  sus- 
ceptible to  land  attack,  other  elements  of  the  fixed  armament  should 
be  mounted  in  the  future  for  all-around  fire,  where  practicable,  with- 
out sacrificing  range  and  ade(}uate  protection  against  naval  attack. 
Such  as  are  susceptible  of  being  mounted  on  movable  carriages 
shoukl  be  so  mounted,  with  the  largest  calibers  and  longest  ranges  pos- 
sible of  development  for  such  mounting.  To  make  the  fire  of  the  sea- 
coast  armament  effective  against  the  enemy's  land  batteries  and 
trenches  it  is  essential  that  suitable  ammunition  and  fuses  be  pro- 
vided, that  an  effective  means  of  range  and  position  finding  be 
adopted  :  that  accurate  maps  of  the  land  area  within  the  range  of  the 
fixed  armament  be  provided,  and  that  ample  aero  equipment  be 
furnished  for  reconnoissance  work  and  for  correction  of  fire.  The 
heavy  artillery  can,  by  the  adoption  of  these  means,  use  its  trained 
personnel  to  the  best  advantage  to  assist  the  mobile  troops  in  the 
defense  of  the  fortifications. 

508 

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